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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COM-
PANY OF READING PENN-
SYLVANIA, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MARDEN D. PEARSON, ED-
WARD A. CROFTS, and 
DWAIN J. PEAR'SON, d/b/a 
PEARSON and CROFTS, and 
ROBERT CORPORON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8664 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE ME NT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees generally with the statement 
of facts set out in appellant's brief, but reference 
is made to the record for additional facts which 
which are material to the determination of this 
matter. The record will be referred to hereinafter 
as "R" and the deposition of Robert Corporon as 
"D". 
At the time of the sale of the 1955 Cadillac to 
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Corporon by Pearson and Crofts it was agreed that 
as a part of the consideration the latter would trans-
fer a trailer hitch from a 19'5'3 Cadillac Corporon 
had turned in to the 1955 Cadillac he had pur-
chased (D. 5). This agreement was reduced to 
writing by making it a part of the sales agreement 
(Pltf's Ex. 2.). 
On the date of the sale there was not suffi-
cient time to complete the transfer of the trailer 
hitch and Corporon was instructed to make an 
appointment with the garage foreman (D. 5). An 
appointment was made for Saturday, 'September 
8, 1955 (D. 5). Ferd Sorenson, a mechanic and 
welder employed by Pearson and Crofts (R. 32) 
was assigned to make the transfer by the shop 
foreman (R. 14) and was working on and attach-
ing the trailer hitch to Corporon's 1955 Cadillac 
at the time of the fire which caused the damage 
complained of (D. 7-8). 
Corporon stayed at the garage while the work 
was being performed on his car as he had already 
made plans for a trip to California and was n1erely 
waiting for the completion of the work in order to 
leave (D. 7). The fact that Corporon was present 
while the work was being done does not alter the 
fact that a bailment existed between him and Pear-
son & Crofts for the purpose of having· work done 
on his automobile. 
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STATEMENT OF POIN'TS 
POINT I. 
AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS DAM-
AGED IT WAS IN THE CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL 
OF THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, PEARSON 
AND CROFT'S. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS DAM-
AGED IT WAS IN THE CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL 
OF THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, PEARSON 
AND CROFT'S. 
The policy of insurance issued to the appellant 
Pearson and Crofts by the respondent insured Pear-
son and Crofts for property damage liability, but 
under Paragraph 4 of the exclusions excluded cover-
age for liability resulting from "* * * injury to or 
destruction of * * * 2. * * * property in the 
care, custody or control of the insured * * *''. 
Appellants do not dispute the fact that if the 
automobile of Corporon was in the care, custody or 
control of Pearson and Crofts at the time the dam-
age occurred there is no coverage under the policy 
of insurance issued by the respondent. Therefore, 
the sole question for determination is whether or 
not Corporon's automobile was in the care, custody 
or control of Pearson and Crofts at the time their 
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employee Ferd Sorenson accidentally set fire to it 
with an arc welder. 
Corporon brought his automobile to Pearson 
and Crofts in accordance with an agreement en-
tered into in advance for the purpose of having a 
trailer hitch installed on his automobile. Pearson 
and Crofts were, among other things, engaged in 
the business of an automobile sales agency and re-
pair garage and in connection with the latter main-
tained and equipped a service garage and repair 
shop and employed mechanics, welders and other 
personnel for the purpose of performing work on 
customers' automobiles. 
While the question of what constitutes "care, 
custody or control" appears to be one of first im-
pression with our court, the matter has been the 
subject of consideration by other courts, and under 
strikingly similar circumstances they haYe held the 
property to have been in the "care, custody or con-
trol'' or "in charge of" the garage and consequently 
excluded the policy. 
In the case of 1llaryla?z.d Cas1J.alty Company Y. 
Holmsga;ard etal, 133 N. E. 2d 910 (Ill. 56). Holms-
gaard drove his car to the Gem ,, ... elding and Ma-
chine Shop in Rockford, Illinois, and left it to have 
a trailer hitch welded to the fran1e. ''""l1ile a Gem 
employee was working on the job the car caught 
fire from the welding torch and 'vas totally destroy-
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ed. The shop was covered by Maryland Casualty 
Company's M & S schedule liability policy with 
express coverage under premises operations for 
welding work. An exclusion clause stated the policy 
did not apply to "injury to or destruction of * * * 
property in the care, custody or control of the 
insured.'' 
Holrnsgaard brought suit against the shop and 
the employee, alleging that while the car was under 
the "sole care, custody and control" of defendants 
his car had been destroyed through their negligence. 
Later he amended the complaint by striking out the 
quoted words and inserted instead "while in the 
possession of the defendants as bailees for hire". 
Maryland Casualty brought an action for a declara-
tory judgment as to its rights and duties, maintain-
ing the exclusion clause barred coverage. 
The trial court gave judgment against Mary-
land Casualty and they appealed. The appeal court 
reversed the trial court's decision and held that the 
property was a bailment, and bailment includes 
custody and control. The property was property in 
the care, custody and control of the insured and 
excluded by the policy. 
In the case of Guidici v. Pacific Automobile 
Insur~anc.e Comp~any, 179 Pac. 2d 337 (Calif. 1947), 
J. A. Palmquist left his automobile with Earl Clif-
ford, a garage owner, to have the carburetor re-
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paired. While Clifford was cleaning the carburetor 
after its removal from the car, a fire started on 
the work bench where he was working. The fire 
spread and Palmer's automobile was destroyed. 
Clifford carried a policy of liability insurance 
insuring him against liability for property damage 
in the operation of his place of business. The in-
surer denied coverage upon the grounds that the 
policy excluded coverage for damage to "property 
owned by, rented to, leased to in charge of or trans-
ported by the insured''. -
The District Court of Appeal affirmed the de-
cision of the trial court and held that Earl Clifford 
was a "bailee" of the automobile under a bailment 
for purposes of performing services upon it and 
as sueh the property was in his "charge, possession 
and control". 
In the. case of John G. Speirs & Company v. 
Underwriters at Lloyd's London: 191 Pac. 2d 124 
(Calif. 1948), a Dodge truck belonging to Gussie 
Speirs was in the possession of plaintiffs on their 
business property in Bakersfield for the purpose 
of having a trailer hitch installed. There was no 
such hitch then on the truck. The trailer hitch was 
pre-fabricated by plaintiffs and 'Yas bei11g welded 
on the frame of the truck when a fire occurred, 
damaging the truck. The policy of insurance pro-
vided as follows: 
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''It is expressly agreed that the agree-
ment of the company to indemnify attaches 
only when the liability imposed by law upon 
the assured exceeds the amount stated in 
item (a) and (b) below and then only for 
such excess. 
" (a) $5,000 as respects any one claim or 
series of claims arising out of any 
one occurrence by reason of the 
ownership, operation, maintenance 
or control of any automobile. 
"(b) $100 as respects any claim or series 
of claims arising out of any one 
occurrence other than described 
above." 
Plaintiff sought to have coverage apply under 
(b). Defendant claimed the loss to be under (a) as 
the truck was in the control of the plaintiff. 
The court, in holding that coverage (a) applied, 
states at Page 125: 
''There can be little doubt that the Dodge 
truck was under the control of plaintiffs at 
the time of the fire and that the claim for 
damages against them arose out of an occur-
rence by reason of that control.'' 
Appellants apparently contend that Pearson and 
Crofts did not have "care, custody or control" of 
the automobile by reason of the fact that Corporon 
was present while the work was being done. It is 
submitted that such fact is completely and wholly 
immaterial. He brought his automobile to the garage 
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for the specific purpose of having a trailer hitch 
installed. He was entitled to, and did tell them of 
the work he wanted done and the result desired. 
Work of the nature and type he sought was the 
business of the garage. In order for the garage 
to perform the work, Corporon had to entrust the 
care of the automobile to them. AB a bailee the 
burden was on the garage to see that the installa-
tion and welding of the trailer hitch was done in a 
safe and workmanlike manner, and in order to do 
this the garage had to have the power or authority 
to manage, direct and supervise the installation and 
work done. 
"Bailment" as defined by Black's Law Diction-
ary Is: 
''A delivery of goods or personal property 
by one person to another in trust for the exe-
cution of a special object upon or in relation 
to such goods, beneficial either to the bailor 
or bailee or both and upon a contract, express 
or implied, to perform the trust and carry out 
such object, and thereupon either to re-deliver 
the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose 
of same in conformity \Yith the purpose of 
the trust." 
Appellants in their brief set out definitions 
for the words "care, custody and control", citing 
such words as being inherently ambiguous and as 
such should be construed against the insurer who 
wrote them. While respondent does not deny that 
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such definitions may have been given, a definition, 
to be of value, must be applied in the light of a par-
ticular fact situation. In the Holmsgaard, Guidici 
and Speirs cases (supra), the question of ambiguity 
was raised in considering the words "care, custody 
or control" and "in charge of". In each of those 
cases the court held the wording to be clear and un-
ambiguous and that as such the rule of construction 
as cited by the appellants does not apply. The court, 
in the Holmsgaard case, in considering the words 
"care, custody and control", words identical to those 
in the case at bar, said: 
''The language of the policy is clear. The 
ruling that ambiguous language is to be con-
strued most strongly against the insurer does 
not authorize a perversion of language or the 
exercise of inventive powers for the purpose 
of creating an ambiguity where none exists". 
Appellants state in their brief that if the "care, 
custody or control" exclusion is applied, there is no 
conceivable situation in which an insurer, under a 
garage liability coverage, would be exposed to risk. 
Such is not the case. The garage owner is protected 
against liability imposed upon him as a result of 
injury to or destruction of property arising out 
of such coverages as are afforded under the policy, 
subject to applicable policy conditions and exclu-
sions. Thus, under the policy in question, if the 
damage results to the property upon which the in-
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sured performed service, after it leaves his care, 
custody or control and the damage results from the 
insured's negligence, he is covered under the policy. 
For example, in the case at bar, if the mechanic 
Ferd Sorenson had failed to properly weld the hitch 
to Corporon's car and it had come loose while Cor-
paron was pulling his trailer to California, Pearson 
and Crofts would be covered for any liability im-
posed upon them. There are numerous other ex-
amples of where coverage applies, such as the case 
where the garage fails to replace the oil in an auto-
mobile motor and it is damaged, or where the oil 
plug is left out or is not secured properly, or in a 
case where the steering mechanism of an automo-
bile is not repaired properly and the owner or driver 
loses control, causing injury or damage. 
The exclusion of coverage for property in the 
care, custody or control of an insured is found in 
the garage liability coverage because of the sub-
stantial increase in risk. Coverage for loss of or 
damage to property in care, custody or control is 
available· to a garage owner either by endorsement 
on his garage liability coverage or by a separate 
policy. An additional premiun1 is charged by the 
insurer, and such endorsement or policy generally 
carries a deductib.le clause for collision damage and 
full coverage for other types of damage. Pearson and 
Crofts apparently had not seen fit to secure this 
type of coverage. 
10 
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CON'CLUSION 
It is respectfully concluded that the appellant 
Pearson and Crofts as bailees of Corporon's auto-
mobile had care, custody or control of said auto-
mobile regardless of the physical presence of Cor-
paron, and that such care, custody or control clearly 
excludes coverage under respondent's policy of in-
surance under the provisions thereof hereinabove 
set forth. 
The ruling of the Third District Court from 
which this cause arises must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
ROBERT W. BRANDT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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